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[ti]SW[/ti]SK Peshmerga; Pêşmerge - پێشمەرگە - Southern Kurdistan army
Topic Started: 17th November 2012 - 05:40 PM (4,949,573 Views)
kurdishpatriot
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Serdar
The 1000 AT4 which has been given suddenly. Will that make a diffrence in the war? Will it be as affective as the milans? It are a 1000 which is a pretty massive number at once.
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Chatulio
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Pêşeng
Hello Kurdishpatriot,

I have seen very little context about this delivery, but comparing stats make them appear more comparable to the Panzerfaust 3-systems. The AT4 is lighter, the ranges seem to be comparable, the caliber is smaller, the penetration seems to be lower, though many values are naturally military and so precise values can be rare and advertisements from the manufacturer can be optimistic.

A variant called AT4-CS is optimized for urban combat (with a counterweight of salt-water being launched backwards when the main shot forward is fired to absorb the hot gases from the main charge).
In the german military, the Matador might be similar, with plastic bundles launched backwards when the Matador fires to make it recoil-free and allow firing from enclosed spaces.
The AT4 uses a normal optical sight according to what I've found.

If the data I've found is accurate and the shipment comes through, it can help as a light anti-tank weapon. Combined with the tank-hunting courses of the KTCC and the german infantry academy in Hammelburg (where around 30 Peshmerga take courses) they can help taking down IS vehicles and clean out buildings. 1000 weapons of this type could at least spread light AT-capabilities wider among Peshmerga units.


With best regards,

Chatulio
Edited by Chatulio, 9th May 2015 - 08:05 AM.
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kurdishpatriot
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Serdar
Chatulio
9th May 2015 - 07:35 AM
Hello Kurdishpatriot,

I have seen very little context about this delivery, but comparing stats make them appear more comparable to the Panzerfaust 3-systems. The AT4 is lighter, the ranges seem to be comparable, the caliber is smaller, the penetration seems to be lower, though many values are naturally military and so precise values can be rare and advertisements from the manufacturer can be optimistic.

A variant called AT4-CS is optimized for urban combat (with a counterweight of salt-water being launched backwards when the main shot forward is fired to absorb the hot gases from the main charge).
In the german military, the Matador might be similar, with plastic bundles launched backwards when the Matador fires to make it recoil-free and allow firing from enclosed spaces.
The AT4 use an optical sight according to what I've found.

If the data I've found is accurate and the shipment comes through, it can help as a light anti-tank weapon. Combined with the tank-hunting courses of the KTCC and the german infantry academy in Hammelburg (where around 30 Peshmerga take courses) they can help taking down IS vehicles and clean out buildings.


With best regards,

Chatulio
It has been given by the united states already, and i think it has been deliverd already.
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Jim M
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R. Sergeant Major
Chatulio
9th May 2015 - 06:55 AM
Hello Jim,

You, in one sentence, accuse Me, as well as many others, of 'the height of arrogance' for saying that supporting a native group (in this case the KRG) in the Middle East might be a way to end the constant vicious circle of larger interventions and beat doing nothing at all and then You demand support for the KRG?
I have to say I've had it with Your constant accusations whenever You seem to feel like You could twist something to suit Your apparent misconceptions. And demeaning the european support for the KRG is frankly very insulting.

We've already discussed the topic of weapons delivered at length ... if You take a look at the inventories of delivered items by the german military, You might notice that a considerable amount of cargo space is taken up by ammunition, spare parts, special tools, equipment kits and so on for items already delivered. This goes from bullets for G3s, MILAN rockets and special toolkits for the vehicles and Dingo-vehicle tires, doors and windows. That means that more and more of the cargo plane space has to be taken up with logistical support for the delivered weapons, equipment and vehicles. This is called the logistical footprint of the equipment, weapons and vehicles delivered so far. The more, the heavier and the more advanced items are delivered, the more this increase is. That means less new stuff per plane. This could easily explain the focus on equipment that is relatively easy to use and low maintenance (though apparently still enough to fill up plane space with parts and tools, including full engines for Dingos, and spare parts transport for heavy vehicles would mean far less supplies in total for fewer vehicles).

For someone who alleges to have a military background, it always surprises me how little regard You seem to pay to the realities of logistics. From Alexander the Great's great focus on logistics to Sun Tzu's focus on keeping the troops in the field correctly supplied, or the supply requirements that toppled Napoleon's invasion of Russia and helped decide WW II it is a basic building block throughout military history and ignoring it could easily lead to ineffective advanced weapons stopped by lack of logistics so the enemy could simply pick them up or destroy them at his/her leisure. The Vietcong won their war also because of their logistics, apparently something the US realized at the time, seeing what lengths they went to to close down the supply routes (and the Vietcong won their war with relatively primitive weapons, even for their day). And both Gulf Wars were also the success of the US logistics division that to set up fuel supply posts even ahead of the US advance in the second Gulf War to make the run to Bagdad a success. Otherwise the advance would've stalled along the way.
No enthusiasm or degree of passion can make up for lack of logistics.

The weapons and equipment delivered so far already require training and plenty of logistics (over 1500 tons of military materials spread out over 21 flights delivered so far by Germany alone), but seem to be very effective at helping to keep the IS at bay. You could respect that and ask for more, which works so far, or You could insult the donators thoroughly enough that they'll rather put their equipment, weapons and vehicles elsewhere.

That naturally also fully ignores the reality that the western allies are currently fighting in many theatres of operations, from the strengthened Operation Triton that requires military vessels in the middle sea, the observation of the lebanese coast as part of the peace settlement between Israel and the Lebanon, operations to secure humanitarian missions in Africa, over Operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa to having to keep Russia's expansion at bay, which could carry the risk of at least limited warfare between Russia and the NATO, with no guarantee of victory for the NATO. Russia presents its T-14 tank in the victory celebrations to demonstrate technological superiority or at least parity with the west with plans for much greater numbers than the NATO can provide. Germany, e.g. has very low numbers of remaining vehicles, with perhaps 225 tanks now and 328 in a few years, about 20 2A7, some 2A6M and many 2A5 and a few 2A4 ... all in all not very impressive. Only around 19 Puma IFVs are delivered so far, Boxers are likewise in short supply, so Marders have to remain in service. Russia has boasted that it intends to field over 2300 T-14 tanks in a few years. Relations are even worse when it comes to artillery and the german army does not even boast organic anti-air defenses anymore. The Tiger helicopter is still faulty and thus not in widespread distribution ... there simply isn't so much gear that can be spared. And among the european allies Germany is one of the stronger military powers. The Netherlands have, as far as I have heared, even dissolved their tank troops a few years back and the british have closed down their Challenger 2 production.

The west's resources are not unlimited and self-defense needs to come first. I agree that some more support could be given by some, though Germany's recent increases in the frequency of flights likely already comes close to the maximally possible. The US especially could improve their support for the KRG, obviously.


With best regards,

Chatulio
Yes arm the Kurds as its the only group that doesn't have an agenda of hatred. Arm the Kurds without reservation with the best weapons available to the west as they are the only group that is least likely to commit human rights abuses. They will stabilise the situation and end the war. Arming them will have the best of all possible outcomes. The Kurds striking at the heart of the I.S.I.S. in Al-Raqqa will go a long way to ending the war worldwide.

What I propose is winning the war not continuing the tragedy that the west seems bent on continuing indefinitely. The way it is going now can only continue for an undetermined time with all the tragedy and despair that accompanies it.

Win the war or keep it going what's your choice? Keeping it going seems to be the choice of the "West".

I make no apologies to anyone for anything I've said.

Regards,

Jim M



Edited by Jim M, 11th May 2015 - 04:10 PM.
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FulcrumKAF
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Po210

Chatulio and Jim;
Please keep the discussion free from accusations and insults. Both of you have great military knowledge, especially on the armies of your respective countries (Germany and Canada) as well as the situation at the continents and the military aid being sent to KRG. Your discussions are insightful and full of interesting information, so please don't ruin them with personal stuff.

Cheers.
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Chatulio
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Pêşeng
Hello FulcrumKAF,

thank You for Your intervention and Your compliments.
I think it is the most prudent course of action for me to ignore Jim's posts entirely in the future. Trying to have a decent discussion with him is pointless.

EDIT: I've put him onto my ignore list (the first entry there), that way further pointless arguing can be avoided.


With best regards,

Chatulio
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Chatulio
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Pêşeng
Hello Kurdishpatriot,

I haven't seen news articles about the arrival of the AT4 weapons, only the intent to deliver, but naturally not everything is reported, let alone in English.
If so, the weapons can be spread through the units to improve their AT-capabilities.


With best regards,

Chatulio
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kurdishpatriot
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Serdar
i found some sources and this one is the most trusty one.
Quote:
 
The United States, the official said, recently sent a shipment of arms for Kurdish forces in KRG, including a delivery of about 1,000 AT4 antitank systems and hundreds of Milan antitank weapons.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/middleeast/us-weighs-training-iraqis-to-call-in-american-airstrikes-in-isis-fight.html?_r=0
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Chatulio
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Pêşeng
Hello Kurdishpatriot,

then I hope the news is true, it sounds strange as far as MILAN goes, as the website http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product2088.html does not list the US as user of MILAN-missles, so I'm not sure they have the missles in reserve.
Also the US does not directly supply the KRG, so it would have to come through Bagdad and likely will make more news, like the MRAPS did.

Anyway, I hope for the best, would be about time the US pitch in in more ways.


With best regards,

Chatulio
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ALAN
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AT-4 anti tank (1000) has been received
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kurdishpatriot
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Serdar
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga 1000 at4
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Chatulio
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Pêşeng
Hello Kurdishpatriot,

I hope then, that Wikipedia used good sources for their list.
The caliber of the Panzerfaust 3 in the Wiki's list is 'only' the launch-system's caliber, in any case, the standard warhead has a 110mm caliber, though there is a smaller 60mm caliber for situations not calling for the larger warhead.

(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerfaust_3)


With best regards,

Chatulio
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Alasha
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fulcrum check this out:

Norwegian elite soldier fight against ISISi

I wont turn back before Mosul is taken"

Source: http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/05/10/nyheter/norsk_elitesoldat/is-terror/forsvarret/39112523/
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FulcrumKAF
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Po210

Hatten av for han. Svært interessant at han ble en del av ATU-D.
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ALAN
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Kurdish customised called (Sherrker) means fighter
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Don't know this one!
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Basnews: Peshmerga got these from USA


http://www.basnews.com/multimedia/2015/05/10/ئەم-ئۆتۆمبێلە-سەربازیانە-لە-ئەمەریکا/
Edited by ALAN, 13th May 2015 - 01:26 AM.
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Jim M
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R. Sergeant Major
Looking at all those home made vehicles I can't help thinking that all that effort could go into the building of an existing design of an armored vehicle. There are some great designs out there that could be built under licence and it looks like there is a talent for building that could be used for this purpose.

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Brazilian EE-9 CASCAVEL with 90mm Cannon. This vehicle is already on the Peshmerga inventory so field experience of the crews that are operating it could be used for upgrades on an assembly line.

All those weapons that the KRG is receiving are for a defensive war. The only way this war can be won is to go on the offensive with weapons like this.
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kurdo82
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Pêşkar
Jim M
12th May 2015 - 04:29 AM
Looking at all those home made vehicles I can't help thinking that all that effort could go into the building of an existing design of an armored vehicle. There are some great designs out there that could be built under licence and it looks like there is a talent for building that could be used for this purpose.

Posted Image

Brazilian EE-9 CASCAVEL with 90mm Cannon. This vehicle is already on the Peshmerga inventory so field experience of the crews that are operating it could be used for upgrades on an assembly line.

All those weapons that the KRG is receiving are for a defensive war. The only way this war can be won is to go on the offensive with weapons like this.
we need to set up a pressure group,
believe it or not the know how is available,
here in germany alone, you have thousands of kurds who knows everything about cutting and wielding, who know how to operate cnc machines or mechanical robots, there are lot of people, specialized in mocrocontroller programing or cad programing,
there s a lot of expertise which could be bought all around the world,
even inside the krg there are a lot of talented and educated young people who would work on it, its all about the interference of a state actor and money either from private funds or private companies,
we kurds could set up ammunition factories, we could even develop our own assault guns, grenade launchers or rocket launchers
the sherker is a good exemple of it,
its heavily armored and the turret could be remodeled to install an rc turret armed with four to eight tubes of recoiless rifles or to put even a 57 mm gun on it,
the kurds could use them as mother vehicles for ther infantry crews, attach a trailer with robotized weapon platforms, based on small tracked rc vehicles light vehicles armed with 12,7 mm guns or 20 mm machinecanons taking over the role of the technical, there are so many programs and vhicles out there that could be used
the homemade kurdish apc may not the best technical solution but they are perfectly suited for the battle area, they are better armored then the american mrap and they function more like traditional apc s,
why cant the kurds build 1000 of these apc type vehicles
are the kurds not able to build bearings with new turrets on them, armed with heavier weapons ?

the EE 9 Cascavel is a pretty good exemple,
its a truck based vehicle,
kurds could use a 8x8 civilian truck and build a new frame on it with a big turret ring, the trurret ring could be electrically driven, not that difficult to build and i thnk , we kurds could go even further and reverse engineer the 115 mm tank gun and fit them on heavier platform that would withstand the recoil, something like the roikaat or the centauro
the technical expertise is there, its even there to reverse engineer a turbojet engine like the rolls royce nene engine and build our own bomber fleet and ground support planes ,
i mean we could use the b 24 or even b 29 as a base model and then build a bomber being able to carry a payload of 5000 to 10.000 kilogram,
even if they would only use primitive unguided bombs, they could have a devasting effect on enemy positions, who says we could not build a jet aircraft that is armed with an array of unguided rockets and bombs or rows of 23 mm machine canons.
The nene jet engine is pretty robust and simple to build, a proven design and you can have all the details by visiting a museum.

Really lets set up a facebook page and lets present our ideas , who s supportimg this idea ?
i have dozens of ideas and i really would like to share with you and we may need to garner further support within the community to pressure our government into supporting these efforts.
Edited by kurdo82, 12th May 2015 - 05:15 PM.
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Brendar
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Salar
FFS its not rocket surgery how many years will this reunification nonsense take. Its getting ridiculous now.


Experts: Peshmerga need vision for unification

ERRBIL, South Kurdistan -- The Peshmerga need a better vision and strategy for the future, according to visiting military experts, while leaders of the Kurdish forces remain focused on the immediate demands and shortages of the ongoing war against Daash .

A conference in Hewlêr on Sunday, titled “The Future of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Kurdistan, brought together foreign experts, Iraqi military officers and Peshmerga leaders to discuss sometimes troubling history on the Kurdish forces and the challenges ahead.

Organized by the Middle East Research Institute (MERI), speakers at the conference were divided on whether the current crisis provides an opportunity, or an obstacle, in the slow process of unifying and reforming the Peshmerga.

At present, only around one-third of Peshmerga forces are united under the Ministry of Peshmerga. The remainder is divided in loyalty between the rival political parties the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

The origins of the Peshmerga as partisan guerilla forces made unification difficult, Secretary General of the Ministry of Peshmerga Jabar Yawar told the audience. He praised efforts since 2010 to bring together one-third of the Peshmerga under one ministry, citing the fact the two politically aligned two factions fought a civil war during the 1990s.

“We used to be two forces. We were fighting against each other, unfortunately,” Yawar said. “So the process of reunification will be step by step. Let's not underestimate that we were able to form 14 brigades in just four years who are now fighting side by side together without any hint of political issues.”

Yawar cited the current war against the Daash and the ongoing financial dispute with the federal government in Baghdad as the primary obstacles to faster unification.

With troops needed at the frontlines, it was difficult to draw units to the rear for unification, he said.

He estimated the cost of running the Peshmerga at $2.9 billion annually, but claimed they had received just $1.2 billion in 2014.

“If they send this amount, it will cover just the salaries within the 14 existing brigades,” Yawar said.

More cash would be needed to fund a centralized joint operations room, a unified communication system and a professional staff, all necessary precursors to a unified Peshmerga.

Former Peshmerga minister Sheikh Jaffar Sheikh Mustafa also insisted that the immediate needs of the Peshmerga – currently leading a critically important global fight against Daash – should be the current focus of discussions.

“Daash have better equipment and training but the Peshmerga has the outstanding morale necessary to defeat the enemy,” he said. “If we had the military equipment we need though we could save a lot of lives.

“We need and we ask our friends and coalition partners to give us these weapons so we can destroy and defeat Daash .”

This foreign assistance would likely be more forthcoming if the Ministry of Peshmerga could clearly articulate their strategic vision for the future, argued Florence Taub, a senior analyst for the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

The role of the Peshmerga had changed since their inception as bands of mountain guerillas, she noted and a new vision was needed.

“It would help your own cause if you know what you want to achieve when asking for equipment,” she said. “Do not forget the strategic vision.”

Likewise Mick Bednarek, the chief of the United States Department of Defense's Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, urged Peshmerga leaders to look beyond the immediate threat and consider what a future enemy might look like.

“It's a strategic error to plan for facing old enemies,” he said.

Yezid Sayigh, a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, offered a vision to which a future Ministry of Peshmerga might aspire.

He spoke of the need for a clear and transparent ministry where individual success was not dependent on loyalty or affiliations.

Sayigh said the Peshmerga would be most effective as a force if there was an officer corps where promotion was based on merit and “everyone has equal access and opportunity at every stage up the chain.”

He noted that many Middle Eastern armed forces had an issue with too many senior officers or with junior officers not being able to rise through the ranks.

“There doesn't seem to be much disagreement,” on these issues, he told the audience.

“Is there any reason why you don't move further forward? I don't know.”

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/11052015
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Brendar
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Salar
The Middle East Research Institute (MERI) visits the frontline as part of the Institutionalisation of Peshmarga Forces Project

http://www.meri-k.org/?p=19667
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AlanJunior
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Liberal

Unification is not a hard or long procedure but it does mean that the two parties would have to give up their "plan b" if they lose support which currently involves the PUK more.
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ALAN
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Jim M
12th May 2015 - 04:29 AM
Looking at all those home made vehicles I can't help thinking that all that effort could go into the building of an existing design of an armored vehicle. There are some great designs out there that could be built under licence and it looks like there is a talent for building that could be used for this purpose.

http://i.ytimg.com/vi/-9DpBjMUF64/maxresdefault.jpg

Brazilian EE-9 CASCAVEL with 90mm Cannon. This vehicle is already on the Peshmerga inventory so field experience of the crews that are operating it could be used for upgrades on an assembly line.

All those weapons that the KRG is receiving are for a defensive war. The only way this war can be won is to go on the offensive with weapons like this.
We have these EE-9s guys here are some, we should just copy some 100s more of them

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At 3:17
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ALAN
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ICG Report: Recommendations for arming KRG Kurds, fighting Daash

Posted on May 12, 2015 by Editorial Staff in 1 Top News, Politics

International Crisis Group | Middle East Report N°15812 May 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Loosely organised in an ad hoc coalition, Western countries rushed military aid to KRG Kurds in the face of a lightning assault by the Daash (IS) in June 2014. They failed, however, to develop a strategy for dealing with the consequences of arming non-state actors in Iraq, a country whose unity they profess to support. Rather than forging a strong, unified military response to the IS threat, building up Kurdish forces accelerated the Kurdish polity’s fragmentation, increased tensions between these forces and non-Kurds in disputed areas and strengthened Iraq’s centrifugal forces. Delivered this way, military assistance risks prolonging the conflict with IS, worsening other longstanding, unresolved conflicts and creating new ones. A new approach is called for that revives and builds on past efforts to transform Kurdish forces into a professional institution.

Despite Western concerns, doing so is unlikely to enhance chances of Kurdish independence. Kurdish parties have become even more dependent, not less, on their alliances with Turkey and Iran since IS’s arrival. Turkey, the country with the ability to give the Kurds the independent revenue stream from oil sales they would need to move effectively toward independence, has given no indication it is prepared to do so and every indication it wishes to preserve Iraq’s unity. Western states’ current practice of channelling weapons to the Kurds via Baghdad and encouraging the two sides to resolve their outstanding disputes over oil exports and revenues also will keep the Kurdish region inside Iraq. Indeed, the development of a professional Kurdish military force is a necessary condition for effective coordination with the Baghdad government in joint operations against IS and in preparing a post-IS political plan.

Coalition military aid is premised on a belief that giving weapons and training to Kurdish forces, known as peshmergas, will in itself improve their performance against IS, a notion Kurdish leaders were quick to propagate. But the evolving state of Iraqi Kurdish politics makes for a rather more ambiguous picture: the dominant, rival parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), have been moving away from a strategic framework agreement that had stabilised their relationship after a period of conflict and allowed them to present a unified front to the central government as well as neighbouring Iran and Turkey. Moreover, their historic leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, are on the political wane, triggering an intra-elite power struggle.

This is, therefore, a particularly fragile moment. Rather than shore up Kurdish unity and institutions, the latest iteration of the “war on terror” is igniting old and new internecine tensions and undermining whatever progress has been achieved in turning the peshmergas into a professional, apolitical military force responding to a single chain of command. In doing so, it is also paving the way for renewed foreign involvement in Kurdish affairs, notably by Iran. And it is encouraging Kurdish land grabs and a rush on resources in territories they claim as part of their autonomous region, further complicating their rapport with Sunni Arab neighbours and the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

On the face of it, after an initial delivery directly to the KDP in August 2014, Western military aid has been provided to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with prior approval from Baghdad. In practice, however, weapon deliveries from a variety of donors are unilateral, mostly uncoordinated and come without strings regarding their distribution and use on the front lines. As a result, they have disproportionately benefited the KDP, which is dominant in Hewlêr, the region’s capital, and thus have pushed the PUK into greater reliance on Iranian military assistance and an alliance with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdish rebel organisation in Turkey. In this context, the KDP and PUK, formal partners in a unity government, have shown little inclination to distribute roles or mount joint operations, preferring competition over coordination. As a result, Kurdish forces have been less effective in fighting IS than they could have been.

While coalition members have tied military assistance to acceptance of the central government’s sovereign role in its distribution, they are jeopardising their stated interest in preserving Iraq’s unity. Indeed, by upsetting the fragile equilibrium among Kurds, between Kurds and Sunni Arabs and between the Kurds and the governments in Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, they risk weakening it; moreover, by empowering Kurdish party-based forces, they hasten the state’s de-institutionalisation and invite external interference. Given how fragile and fragmented Iraq has become, one can only wonder how pouring more arms into it could have any chance of making it stronger.

Coalition members, working in coordination, need instead to persuade Kurdish parties to complete the reunification of their parallel military, security and intelligence agencies within a single, non-partisan structure by empowering the KDP-PUK joint brigades and the peshmergas’ most professional elements; to cooperate with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories; and to develop a post-IS plan with the central government that cements security cooperation in these territories and moves forward the process of resolving their status through negotiation.

The KRG leadership is overdue in putting its own house in order. It may revel in momentary support for its fight against IS, but old problems will soon return, arguably posing a far more serious threat to the region’s stability than IS by itself could ever represent.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the governments of the U.S. and other coalition members:

1. Establish a coalition central command through which to channel military aid to KRG Kurds and charge it with:
a) coordinating weapons deliveries to, and training of, Kurdish peshmerga forces by coalition members;

b) ensuring that weapons are exclusively distributed to, and used by, KDP-PUK joint brigades;
c) engaging the peshmerga affairs minister and KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders on military tactics and the use of coalition-supplied weapons; and

d) conditioning military support on coordination of anti-IS operations with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories and the Abadi government, and drafting with the Abadi government a post-IS plan that foresees the reinstatement of local institutions and security forces in these areas.

To the peshmerga affairs minister and the KDP and PUK leaderships:

2. Establish a joint operations room bringing together the minister, KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders and relevant security agencies to draft a Kurdish national security strategy that would ease delivery of coalition military aid.

3. Continue to integrate paramilitary forces into KDP-PUK joint brigades that respond to a single chain of command and refrain from deploying irregular forces against IS.

4. Improve coordination with the Abadi government and Iraqi army on the provision of weapons and training to the KRG.

5. Complete integration of the KDP and PUK military, security and intelligence services into the KRG.

To the Kurdistan region presidency:

6. Encourage consolidation of KRG institutions in general and the peshmerga affairs ministry in particular and their emancipation from partisan control.
7. Engage the Abadi government on the future of the disputed territories and local institutions and refrain from calls for Kurdish independence.

8. Redouble efforts to coordinate KRG regional security operations with PKK and PKK-allied forces.
To the government of Iraq:

9. Develop a joint security strategy with the KRG to counter IS, and work with the KRG to settle outstanding disputes over oil exports and budget allocations.
To the governments of Turkey and Iran:

10. Support coalition efforts toward institutionalising peshmerga forces and reinforcing their cooperation with the central government.

Baghdad/Hewlêr/Brussels, 12 May 2015

Copyright ©, respective author or news agency, crisisgroup.org

http://ekurd.net/icg-report-recommendations-for-arming-iraqs-kurds-fighting-islamic-state-2015-05-12
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ALAN
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US will provide weapon for Kurds if Baghdad refrains: Zalmay Khalilzad

Former U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad stated Washington would arm KRG Kurds if the central government in Baghdad refrains from sending the weapons Kurds need in fighting against the militants of the Daash (IS).
Speaking with Rudaw, Khalilzad called Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani’s visit to the U.S. decisive and stated Barzani has discussed Mosul liberation operation, Kurdistan Region’s economic crisis and the troubles of the refugees in the region during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama.
He also stressed on the influential and important role of the Kurdish forces of Peshmerga in fighting against the IS and said Washington would provide needed weapons for the forces if Baghdad refrains to arm them.
He further called the region’s independent oil export natural as long as the central government in Baghdad does not send the region’s share of the national budget.
Barzani met Obama on Tuesday in White House and called the meeting as very successful.

http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=10320#Title=%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09%09US will provide weapon for Kurds if Baghdad refrains: Zalmay Khalilzad%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09
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Chatulio
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Hello ALAN,

the analysis of the military support to the kurds is naturally interesting, some aspects sound a bit like armchair-quarterbaking though.

For one, a strong alliance between factions in Iraq was unviable from the start, as Bagdad's policies drove non-shi'ite and non-arab factions away. The kurdish parties would certainly be more effective together, but waiting for them to unify and provide the institutions and combined leadership would've likely meant waiting too long. The deliveries had to be done at a time to do some good at least.

Likewise waiting until all western allies have agreed on a common delivery and training strategy would've likely taken too much time. Over time the training has been coordinated in the KTCC, so that part is already done. Coordinated deliveries might be nice, but again, they would mean delays and some nations might refrain from sending things when they have to coordinate with the others and might only have things that don't fit the coordinated strategy.

Tracking every piece of equipment, weapon or vehicle to make sure they'd only be used by joint brigades is unfeasible given the sheer amount of military materials sent by Germany, for example. Tracking the whereabouts of over 20 000 assault rifles, 90 MILAN launchers, 16 Dingos, .... would already require much oversight and intervention into kurdish military matters even in times of peace. In a nation at war it sounds ... questionable at best.

Forcing a central command & control infrastructure sounds a lot like something that the kurdish parties have to sort out themselves, it would be ideal to have such an infrastructure, but forcing it from the outside is unlikley to work. I can thus understand that the western factions largely agreed to back the KRG only and hope that, over time, the other parties join forces with the KRG to create what can't be enforced from the outside. And trying to condition any supply deliveries on the kurds coordinating defense with non-kurd factions sounds likewise dubious. Aside from being unfriendly strongarm-politics, it could instead foster further resentment. Plus seeing that some anti-IS factions may be enemies of kurdish factions after the war, forcing to coordinate in the war with them could increase conflicts and antipathies further.

And drawing up plans on what to do after the war with IS sounds ... difficult seeing how unforseeable the situation is at the moment and the status of territories, relations, supplies and other affairs at the time the war ends seem too unpredictable and fluid to firmly plan an after-war situation already.
Who knows whether the factions and their leaderships 'obey' the 'script' of any such agreement or whether the agreement will be a moot point shortly after writing if events overtake the plans?

Overall, the analysis can be insightful, but many recommendations sound suspect and distanced from the reality of the developments and relations as they are.


With best regards,

Chatulio
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Jim M
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ALAN
13th May 2015 - 12:08 AM
US will provide weapon for Kurds if Baghdad refrains: Zalmay Khalilzad

Former U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad stated Washington would arm KRG Kurds if the central government in Baghdad refrains from sending the weapons Kurds need in fighting against the militants of the Daash (IS).
Speaking with Rudaw, Khalilzad called Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani’s visit to the U.S. decisive and stated Barzani has discussed Mosul liberation operation, Kurdistan Region’s economic crisis and the troubles of the refugees in the region during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama.
He also stressed on the influential and important role of the Kurdish forces of Peshmerga in fighting against the IS and said Washington would provide needed weapons for the forces if Baghdad refrains to arm them.
He further called the region’s independent oil export natural as long as the central government in Baghdad does not send the region’s share of the national budget.
Barzani met Obama on Tuesday in White House and called the meeting as very successful.

http://www.kurdpress.com/En/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=10320#Title=%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09%09US will provide weapon for Kurds if Baghdad refrains: Zalmay Khalilzad%0A%09%09%09%09%09%09%09
Having reached an accord in a meeting and producing a piece of paper is one thing but putting it into practice in the real world is another thing altogether. We will see how this turns out in the coming months.

If Baghdad agrees then it will be up to them what gets delivered to the Kurds and what they deliver could be anything. It may be that the weapons that are going to be delivered may be just more of the same and not what is required to pursue the war to a successful conclusion and the whole thing is just another exercise in futility.

If I was a Kurd I wouldn't get my hopes up over this.

Regards,

Jim M
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